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Based on a large matched employer-employee data set for Sweden, this study 
analyses gender differences in rent sharing. Results indicate a general pattern of 
significantly smaller remuneration from firm profits for women. Gender differences 
in rent sharing, however, explain less than two percent of gender wage differentials. 
This is not unexpected, as gender differences are found not in the mean profit levels 
of employing firms, but in remuneration from firm profit. 
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 1.   Introduction 
 
This study, using a large matched employer-employee data set, analyses 
gender differences in rent sharing, and estimates if these differences 
provide a partial explanation to the gender wage gap. The effect of firm or 
industry profits on wages has been empirically documented in previous 
studies but few have analysed potential gender differences in rent sharing.
1 
Initial gender specific estimation in Sweden by Arai (1999) and Arai & 
Heyman (2001) indicate that the association between firm profits and 
wages significantly differs between women and men. Although both 
experience a positive effect of firm profit on wages, the magnitude of this 
effect is smaller for women.
2  
There are a number of potential theoretical explanations for gender 
differences in rent sharing, elaborated on in the next section. In short, 
gender differences in rent sharing may be due to gender differences in 
bargaining strength or in outside options affecting wage bargaining 
outcomes. A systematic sorting of women and men into firms with varying 
profitability or varying capital intensity may also provide a partial 
explanation. In addition, there may be a sorting by gender, within firms, 
into positions with varying possibilities of rent extraction. The purpose of 
this paper will be to analyse various explanations for gender differences in 
rent sharing and estimate the implications for the male-female wage 
differential. As such, it adds to the growing empirical literature turning to 
workplace characteristics, especially productivity related factors, in 
association with individual characteristics to explain the gender wage gap. 
                                                            
1 Initial studies in Sweden, Homlund & Zetterberg (1991) using aggregated industry 
data and Forslund (1994) using manufacturing firm-level data, found no evidence for 
the existence of rent sharing. With the availability of micro data, Arai (1999) and Arai 
& Heyman (2001) with matched employer-employee data, were able to document a 
positive effect of firm profit on wages in Sweden. Other studies confirming rent sharing 
using longitudinal matched employer-employee data include Abowd et al., (1999) and 
Margolis & Salvanes (2001). See also Abowd & Lemiux (1993) and Cristofides & 
Oswald (1992) using Canadian contract data as well as Katz & Summer (1989) using 
U.S. employee data. For European studies see Blachflower et al., (1996), Hildreth & 
Oswald (1997), Nickell et al., (1994) and the references therein. 
2 Arai (1999) using an employer-employee data set covering approximately 600 firms 
and 800 employees finds an insignificant relationship between firm average profits and 
wages for women amounting to one-third of the corresponding significant male 
estimate. Arai & Heyman (2001) using a larger employer-employee data set (over 
100,000 employees matched to over 6,000 firms) find a significant effect of firm profit 
on wages for both women and men, but smaller for women. The elasticity of wages with 
respect to profits is 0.017 for men and 0.010 for women, indicating significant 
differences in rents. 
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 The results presented in this study indicate a pattern of significantly smaller 
remuneration from lagged firm profit on wages for female employees. 
Sorting into firms within different industries or with differing capital 
intensity partially explain these gender differences. The elasticity of wages 
with respect to firm profits is consistently 30 – 60 percent lower for women 
than comparable male estimates. Rent sharing is found to generally 
increase along the wage distribution but differences in remuneration 
between high wage female and male employees is also found to increase. 
OLS regressions, estimating the mean effect of various characteristics on 
wages, indicate that gender differences in rent sharing do little to explain 
the gender wage gap when including controls for human capital and 
industry affiliation. Firm profits explain no more than two percent of the 
gender wage differential in Sweden, as men and women, on average work 
within firms with similar mean profit levels.  
The results presented here therefore differ from the only known, to the 
author, comparable empirical study, Rycx (2002). This study, analysing the 
Belgian labor market, finds that gender differences in rent sharing explain 
14 percent of the gender wage gap due to a sorting, by gender, into firms 
with varying profitability. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section gives a brief 
theoretical overview of why gender differences in rent sharing may arise. 
Section 3 describes the data and introduces the empirical set-up. Results are 
discussed in Section 4, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
 
2.   Theoretical background 
 
Simple models of bargaining, over wages and employment, theoretically 
illustrate a link between profits and wages.
3 In a standard Nash-bargaining 
set up, firms maximize a profit function and negotiate with a union or 
group of workers maximizing a wage gain for its members. The 
equilibrium wage is a function of workers’ outside options,
4 the quasi rents 
per worker, i.e., by firm profit evaluated at the opportunity cost of labor, 
and the relative bargaining power of the parties involved. Gender 
differences in bargaining outcomes, controlling for human capital 
differences, are then a result of gender differences in outside options, 
                                                            
3 See for example Blanchflower et al., (1996).  
4 As determined by wages in other sectors of the economy, unemployment benefit levels 
and unemployment rates. 
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 systematic differences in the profit levels of firms men and women are 
sorted into or due to gender differences in bargaining strength.
5  
Sap (1993) introduces gender explicitly into a union bargaining 
framework by modelling a two-stage negotiation process where the first 
stage is characterized by internal negotiations within a union, or employee 
organisation, between men and women preceding second stage bargaining 
at the collective level between the union and the firm.
6 Combining first 
order conditions from the first and second stage yields the standard 
solutions of the monopoly union model, i.e., that wage rates depend on the 
average levels of unemployment benefits and on the elasticity of demand 
for labor, but now with two additional determinants. Wage rates are found 
to also depend on the relative bargaining strength of female and male 
unionists and the threat points of each group, i.e., by female and male 
unemployment benefit levels.
7  
Some degree of rent sharing may also be bargained at the individual 
level. Wage drift from collective bargaining outcomes to the individual 
level has, in Sweden, been verified in previous studies.
8 If women, on 
average, are less proficient at bargaining over wages, gender differences in 
rent sharing can arise. In addition, women may self-select out of or have 
limited access to positions where wage outcomes vary according to firm 
performance. 
Gender differences in the capital-to-labor ratio of employing firms may 
also be a source for rent sharing differences between men and women. Katz 
and Summers (1989) argue that wages tend to be higher in capital-intensive 
industries as workers are assumed to have more leverage to extract rents 
during wage bargaining within these firms.  If there are systematic 
differences in the capital-intensity of firms to which men and women are 
sorted into, this too may provide a partial explanation for gender 
differences in rent sharing.  
 
 
                                                            
5 At the collective level, gender differences in bargaining strength may for example, be 
influenced by the gender composition of the workers union. 
6 In the first stage, men and women maximise group specific gains, by gender, from 
bargaining, i.e., maximise the total income of the female (male) labor force where the 
threat point is defined as the level of female (male) unemployment benefits.  
7 See Sap (1993) pp. 27-34 for derivation of the model introducing gender differences in 
the wage bargaining process. The relative bargaining strengths of female and male 
unionists are derived to be the bargaining power of each group divided by its share of 
the labor force. 
8 See for example Holmlund & Skedinger (1990), Holden (1998) and the references 
therein. 
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 3.  Data and empirical set-up 
 
The data stems from the 1991 Level of Living Survey (LNU), a 1/1000 
random sample of the Swedish working-age population (18–65). All 
individuals in the 1991 LNU sample were matched to their employing 
organizations by means of unique organization numbers. These establish-
ments, identified from the LNU individuals, form the basis of the Swedish 
Establishment Survey (APU), a survey collecting administrative data for all 
employees in the above-identified establishments during 1987, 1991 and 
1995. Data on wages and individual characteristics are matched to the 
above individual data. Information on wages comes from the Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Swedish Employers’ Confede-
ration (SAF) wage data as well as from the Income and Asset Register of 
Statistics Sweden (SCB). Individual employment records covering the 
years 1992 - 1995 come from the National Labor Market Board’s (AMS) 
Event Database. Official balance-sheet data for the employing firms are 
matched to the individual data by means of the Swedish system of 
corporate registration numbers. The final data set contains 172,294 
individuals matched to 6,783 firms in 1991 and 175,049 individuals 
matched to 5,331 firms in 1995.
9 
Wages are computed as full time equivalent pre-tax monthly salaries, not 
including overtime compensation. Use of full time equivalent wages allows 
for a gender wage comparison disregarding differences in working time, 
but including controls for experience and seniority.  
Data on profits from official balance-sheet reports are available from 
1987 - 1995. Profits, defined as annual profits after capital depreciation per 
employee, are calculated as four-year averages preceding the two years, 
1991 and 1995, for which wage estimations are calculated. Using four-year 
averages is motivated by the large variation in annual profits as well as by 
minimisation of potential measurement error.   
There are two potential complications in testing for the existence of rent 
sharing. One concerns the potential simultaneity bias between wages and 
profits. A positive correlation between wages and profit is consistent with 
efficiency wage arguments of non-competitive models with barriers to 
entry.
10 As the aim of this study is to estimate the impact of profits on 
wages and not vice versa, lagged averages for firm profit are used in 
estimation. In addition, the accounting relationship between wages and 
                                                            
9 See Appendix for definition of variables used in estimation. 
10 Efficiency wage models predict higher profits for firms that pay higher wages due to 
increased motivation, lower turnover costs, less shirking or via improved 
employer/employee relations. 
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 profits implies that high wages may lead to low profits. Use of lagged 
profits solves these complications, as firm profits are then pre-determined 
in wage estimation.
11 
Initially cross section estimates of the association between lagged 
average profits and wages are calculated for 1991 and 1995, based on a full 













+ = 3 2 1 ln    (1) 
 
Wijt denotes the wages of individual i in firm j at time t, Π/E denotes 
average lagged profit (Π) per employee (E). This average is based on data 
from 1987-1990 for estimation on 1991 data and from 1991-1994 for 
estimation on 1995 data. X is a vector of human capital characteristics 
including education, experience and seniority. IND denotes industry 
affiliation at the two digit SIC level. The robustness of estimation results to 
the addition of individual unemployment history (1995) will be examined 
as well as to other firm and establishment variables such as the capital-to-
labor ratio and gender composition. In order to quantify estimation results, 
the elasticity of wages with respect to profits is reported as well as wage 
gap estimates based on the so-called Pooled Decomposition of Oaxaca 
(1973) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). 
Means tests indicate that the mean profit level of employing firms differs 
significantly between men and women, but that the magnitude of this 
difference is small.
13 Gender differences in the mean profit level of 
employing firms however, increase dramatically when looking at sub 
samples of individuals in leadership positions and even more so for a 
sample of executive directors.
14 In terms of industry differences, the 1991 
                                                            
11 Various instruments for profits have also been tested in the literature, Arai & Heyman 
(2001), for example, in estimation on a similar data set, use demand elasticity in the 
product market and degree of competition as instruments for profits yielding results 
indicating that the positive association between firm profits and wages are robust to 
estimation using instruments.  
12 A full interaction model implies that each explanatory variable is interacted with a 
female dummy variable, allowing for full heterogeneity, in human capital and firm 
effects on wages, between men and women. The full interaction model yields point 
estimates for each explanatory variable (for females calculated by adding the interaction 
term to the explanatory variable in question) equal to estimates generated by regressing 
the wage equation separately by gender. 
13 See sample means in Appendix. 
14 Data on occupational position is available for white-collar workers in the 1995 data. 
Estimation on sub-samples of white-collar workers is discussed further in Section 4. 
5 
 data indicate that women within the mineral extraction, construction and 
manufacturing industries are employed in firms with significantly higher 
mean profits than their male counterparts while within the agricultural and 
retail industries women are found in firms with significantly smaller mean 
profits. The 1995 data shows contrary results for manufacturing, i.e., that 
men are employed within firms in this industry with significantly higher 
mean profit levels. The same holds true for men in services.
15  T h e s e  
descriptive statistics and their relationship to the estimation results will be 





Initially, a full interaction wage regression was estimated for each year, 
with lagged average profit-per-employee (lagged four year averages) as 
well as its interaction with a female dummy variable, as the main explana-
tory variables of interest.
16 In each model specification, all human capital 
and firm variables are interacted with a female dummy variable in order to 
allow for complete heterogeneity in human capital and firm effects between 
men and women.
17 In order to control for the potential bias stemming from 
aggregated firm variables in an individual wage specification, standard 
errors are corrected for within-group correlated errors in all estimations.
18  
The results for 1991, reported in Table 1, show a significant positive 
association between lagged firm profit and individual wages regardless of 
model specification and including controls for industry affiliation. The 
interaction between lagged average profits and gender indicates (weakly) 
significant differences between men and women in remuneration from firm 
profits both without and with controls for human capital (models 1 and 2, 
Table 1). The lower coefficient for lagged profits when controlling for 
human capital indicates that some of the positive association between firm  
                                                            
15 Mean profit levels indicate that the mineral extraction industry has the highest 
average profit levels both years. Other high profit industries include 
gas/water/electricity, manufacturing and retail. Low profit industries include 
post/telecommunications and services. 
16 Lagged average profit-per-employee hereafter referred to as lagged average (firm) 
profit. 
17 The full interaction model, interacting all explanatory variables with the female 
dummy variable, implies that the variable ‘female’ captures remaining gender 
differences in wages, given that men and women are remunerated differently for human 
capital and firm effects. 
18 See Moulton (1990) for discussion on the problems associated with estimating 
aggregate variables on micro units. 
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Table 1: Effect of Firm Average Profits on Wages, 1991  
Dependent variable: log monthly wage. Full interaction model (gender 
interactions). Standard errors corrected for within group (firm) 
correlations. 
 

































































No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
 
No No No Yes No 
R
2  0.09 
 
0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 
No. of Obs.  172,294  172,294  172,294  172,294  172,294 
 
No. of firms  6,783  6,783  6,783  6,783  6,783 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at 
the 10 percent level. Human capital controls include education, seniority, experience 
and experience squared. Industry dummies are at the two-digit level. Human capital 
controls, firm effects and industry dummies all interacted with female dummy variable.  
 
 
profit and wages is due to a sorting of highly educated and skilled 
individuals into profitable firms. Calculating the elasticity of wages with 
respect to firm profits, using gender-specific mean profit levels for 1991, 
yields an estimated elasticity for men equal to 0.021 and for women, 
7 
 0.015.
19 This implies that a 1-percentage point increase in the profits of an 
employing firm has an approximately 30 percent lower effect on female 
wages than male wages.
20  
In order to test the power in numbers argument proposed by Sap (1993), 
i.e., that the proportion of female workers in the bargaining unit influences 
the strength of this group in so called first stage negotiations within the 
union or employee organisation and therefore wage outcomes after second 
stage negotiations with the employer, information on gender composition at 
the establishment level is used. Adding a control for the proportion of 
female employees at the establishment level as well as its interaction with a 
female dummy variable yields results, shown in model 3 of Table 1, that 
gender composition has a negative and significant effect on wages for 
women but an insignificant effect on wages for men. Gender differences in 
rent sharing also increase and remain significant. In separate estimations, 
by gender, the proportion of female employees was interacted with lagged 
average profits. The gender composition/average profits interaction in these 
estimations indicates that gender composition does not influence rents. A 
larger significant difference in rent sharing in model 3 therefore reflects a 
sorting effect by gender into different industries. A relatively high 
proportion of women are found within firms in the retail, bank and 
insurance, and service industries. Of these, only the retail industry is 
characterized by relatively high mean profits.
21 Note however, that within 
the retail industry, the mean profit level of employing firms is significantly 
smaller for women than for men.
22    
Controlling for industry affiliation does not alter results of significant 
gender differences in rent sharing. Female employees have 2,4 percentage 
points lower remuneration for firm profits on wages than their male 
counterparts (see model 4, Table 1). The elasticity of wages with respect to 
profits is equal to 0.022 for men and 0.014 when controlling for industry 
affiliation, i.e., 36 percent lower for female employees. This model 
specification also controls for gender composition implying that gender 
differences in rent sharing exist within industries given a potential sorting 
of men and women into firms with varying profitability. Gender differences 
                                                            
19 Calculated using coefficients from model 2, Table 1. 
20 The elasticity reported for men, falls well within the range of those previously 
reported for Canada, the UK, and the US, as well as for Sweden. See for example, 
Christofides and Oswald (1992), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and for Sweden, Arai & 
Heyman (2001). 
21 See Appendix for mean profit levels by industry. 
22 The mean profit level of employing firms for female employees in the retail industry 
is 0.24 (st. dev. 0.50) compared to 0.37 (st. dev. 0.65) for male employees in 1991. 
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 in rent sharing may then be a consequence of a sorting within firms into 
positions with different possibilities of rent extraction.  
In order to determine whether a systematic sorting of women into firms 
with varying capital intensity explains gender differences in rent sharing, 
the full interaction wage equation is again re-estimated including firm 
capital intensity and its gender interaction.
23 Results for 1991 are shown in 
model 5 of Table 1. The coefficient for firm capital-intensity is positive and 
significant and the interaction term insignificant. The coefficient for lagged 
average profits is significant but somewhat smaller due to the correlation 
between lagged average profits and capital intensity. Gender differences 
remain significant implying that men and women do not appear to be 
systematically sorted into firms with varying capital intensity.  
Wage gap estimates controlling for human capital and industry affiliation 
indicate that a large part of the unadjusted log wage differential of 0.1546 
for 1991 is attributable to the unexplained effect, i.e., to gender differences 
in remuneration for human capital and firm profits within industries.
24 The 
marginal impact of rent sharing is small. Wage decompositions for 
estimation based on firm profit only, indicate that differences in means 
explain only 0.0006 – 0.0008 of the wage gap for 1991, depending on 
assumed non-discriminatory wage structure. This implies that rent sharing 
alone explains less then one percent of the gender wage gap this year, a 
result that is not unexpected as mean differences in the average profit level 
of employing firms, between men and women, are small. The difference 
lies in the coefficients, i.e., in remuneration from firm profits.
25  
The data for 1995 yields somewhat different results as seen in Table 2. 
The association between lagged average profits and wages is smaller than 
1991 estimates, but still positive and significant. 1995 marks the height of 
the economic recession that hit Sweden during this decade with open 
unemployment rates above 10 percent of the labor force.
26 Smaller 
remuneration for firm profits is then consistent with theoretical predictions 
implying lower bargaining power due to poorer outside opportunities. 
Gender differences in rent sharing are of approximately the same magni- 
                                                            
23 Information on capital intensity comes from firm balance-sheet reports and is defined, 
per firm, as lagged average ‘machines’ (assets) per employee, averaged over a four-year 
period. 
24 The unadjusted log wage differential translates into an unadjusted mean female/male 
wage ratio of 0.85 in 1991 and 0.86 in 1995, well in line with previous Swedish 
estimates. For an historical overview of gender wage differentials in Sweden, see 
Johansson et al., (2001). 
25 See Table A3 in Appendix for wage decomposition results. 
26 Unemployment, as a percentage of the labor force, was 10.1 percent in 1995, 
compared to 3 percent in 1991. 
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 Table 2: Effect of Firm Average Profits on Wages, 1995  
Dependent variable: log monthly wage. Full interaction model (gender 
interactions). Standard errors corrected for within group (firm) 
correlations. 
 
































































































No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
 
No No No No Yes No 
R
2  0.06 
 
0.38 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.40 
No. of Obs.  175,049  175,049  175,049  175,049  175,049  175,049 
 
No. of firms  5,331  5,331  5,331  5,331  5,331  5,331 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at 
the 10 percent level. Human capital controls include education, seniority, experience 
and experience squared. Industry dummies are at the two-digit level. Human capital 




 tude as indicated in the 1991 data and significant for controls for human 
capital, gender composition and firm capital intensity but not to controls for 
industry affiliation. This implies that gender differences in rent sharing are 
robust to some forms of sorting between firms, i.e., by gender composition 
and capital intensity, but are not generally found within industries in 1995.  
Estimation on the 1995 data includes a control for individual 
unemployment history. This variable is available for the years 1992-1995 
and therefore estimated on the 1995 data only.
27 Individual unemployment 
history has a negative and significant effect on wages for both male and 
female employees but a significantly less negative effect for women. 
Controlling for individual unemployment history does not explain gender 
differences in rent sharing, both lagged average profits and its gender 
interaction remain significant. Separate regressions, by gender, including 
interactions between lagged average profit and individual unemployment 
history indicate that individual unemployment has a negative and 
significant effect on rents for men only.
28 Estimates of the elasticity of 
wages with respect to firm profits, calculated for gender specific mean 
profit levels for 1995, indicate that estimates for female employees are 
approximately 45 - 65 percent smaller than comparable estimates for male 
employees, depending on model specification estimated on. 
The results reported above indicate that female employees have 
approximately 2 percentage points lower remuneration for lagged firm 
profits on wages than their male counterparts.  The significance of gender 
differences in rent sharing, between and within industries, varies somewhat 
between the two cross section estimations, notably that gender differences 
are not found within industries in the 1995 data. Accounting for gender 
differences in the mean profit levels of employing firms indicates that the 
elasticity of wages with respect to profits ranges from 30 to 65 percent 
lower for female employees. Wage decompositions on the 1995 data, based 
on estimations of firm profit only, indicate that differences in means 
explain 0.0021 – 0.0034 of the wage gap this year. Rent sharing alone 
therefore explains approximately two percent of the gender wage gap in 
1995 due to slightly larger gender differences in the mean profit levels of 
employing firms. 
In order to analyse more generally if remuneration from firm profits 
differs at different points in the wage distribution, i.e., to see if gender 
differences in rent sharing vary for those at the bottom of the wage 
                                                            
27 Individual employment history is based on data from National Labor Market Board’s 
(AMS) Event Database and is defined as a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
individual is registered as unemployed at anytime during the period 1992-1995.  
28 Results available from author by request. 
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 distribution, in comparison to those at the top of the wage distribution, 
simultaneous quantile regressions are estimated for each year.
29 Results, 
shown in Table 3, for the 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 percentiles of the total wage 
distribution indicate that rent sharing increases along the wage distribution.  
 
Table 3: Effect of Firm Average Profits on Wages at Different 
Percentiles of the Wage Distribution.  
Dependent variable: log monthly wage. Full interaction model (gender 
interactions). Bootstrapped standard errors. 
 
1991 





















Human Capital  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.19  0.21  0.26 
No. of Obs. 
 
161,807 161,807 161,807 
1995 




















Human Capital  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.16 0.21 0.26 
No. of Obs.  175,409  175,409  175,409 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at 
the 10 percent level. Human capital controls include education, seniority, experience 
and experience squared. Proportion female employees at the establishment level also 
included as control variable. Industry dummies are at the two-digit level. Human capital 
controls, firm effects and industry dummies all interacted with female dummy variable. 
 
                                                            
29 This technique has the advantage of using all observations in a single regression 
instead of mechanically dividing the sample into sub-samples and introducing sample 




Employees at the top end of the wage distribution have greater remu-
neration from firm profits than those at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
The coefficient for lagged average profits is equal to 0.037 at the 0.25 
percentile of the 1991 wage distribution, increasing to 0.102 at the 0.75 
percentile (for 1995, respective coefficients are 0.023 and 0.044).  
The deviation in remuneration for female employees is also found to 
increase along the wage distribution. In 1991, female employees at the 0.75 
percentile of the total wage distribution had 5 percentage points lower 
remuneration for firm profits on wages than comparable male employees 
compared to a 1-percentage point difference at the 0.25 percentile. In 1995, 
a 3-percentage point difference is noted at the 0.75 percentile and 
insignificant differences at the 0.25 percentile. In 1991, only small gender 
differences in the mean profit levels of employing firms are found at 
different points on the wage distribution.
30 The 1995 data, however indicate 
that gender differences in the mean profit level of employing firms also 
increase at the top end of the wage distribution implying larger differences 
in rents, on average, between men and women at the 0.75 percentile of the 
wage distribution for this year.
31 
One untested hypothesis is that men and women are sorted into positions 
within firms that differ in terms of their possibility for rent extraction. 
Basic information on the occupational position of white-collar workers is 
available for the 1995 cross-section. Wage estimations, separately by 
gender, on these individuals indicate that those in leadership positions have 
larger rent extraction possibilities. See Table 4. This is especially true for 
the selection of female chief executives who have significantly larger 
coefficients for lagged firm profits in wage estimation than their male 
counterparts and female subordinates. It was however noted earlier that 
women in leadership positions, and especially female top executives, are 
employed in firms with significantly lower mean profit levels than their 
male counterparts. Gender differences in mean profit levels are also shown 
in Table 4 and are significant at the one percent level.  It appears that the  
 
                                                            
30 The data for 1991 indicates that for wages below the 0.25 percentile, mean profits of 
employing firms is equal to 0.30 (st. dev 0.43) for men and 0.28 (st. dev. 0.41) for 
women. For wages above the 0.75 percentiles, mean profits are equal to 0.46 (st. dev. 
0.57) for men and 0.49 for women (st. dev. 0.61). 
31 The data for 1995 indicates that for wages below the 0.25 percentile, mean profits of 
employing firms is equal to 0.28 (st. dev 0.44) for men and 0.26 (st. dev. 0.43) for 
women. For wages above the 0.75 percentiles, mean profits are equal to 0.40 (st. dev. 
0.60) for men and 0.32 for women (st. dev. 0.54). 
13 
 Table 4: Leadership Positions,
 based on data for white-collar 
workers, 1995.  
Dependent variable: log monthly wage. Separate estimation, by gender. 
Standard errors corrected for within group (firm) correlations. Due to 
small number of observations in some estimations, results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 

























Human Capital  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R
2  0.43 0.48  0.42 0.31  0.21 
 
No. of Obs.  917  34  124  338  240 
 















Human Capital  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
R
2  0.40 0.24  0.29 0.25  0.09 
 
No. of Obs.  8,247  348  1,425  1,895  3,460 
 
Mean profit level  0.35  0.40  0.32  0.30  0.40 
Notes: * indicates significance at one percent level, ** at five percent level and *** at 
ten percent level. 




 select group of women in top positions with large possibilities for rent 




5.  Conclusions 
 
This study finds significant differences in rent sharing between men and 
women in cross-section wage estimation for 1991 and 1995. Differing 
forms of sorting, by gender, into firms with varying capital intensity or into 
different industries, partially account for these differences. The elasticity of 
wages with respect to firm profits is estimated to be 30 – 65 percent lower 
for women than comparable male estimates.  These gender differences are 
not explained by individual unemployment history or by gender 
composition at the establishment level.  
Although rent sharing is found to generally increase for employees at the 
upper end of the wage distribution, gender differences in rent sharing also 
increase. Initial estimation on a small sample of white-collar workers in 
leadership positions, however, shows that rent extraction possibilities are 
greater, in general, for those in top positions. This is especially true for the 
small select group of female chief executives. These women are also found 
within, on average, less profitable firms implying that the elasticity of 
wages with respect to firm profits remains generally smaller for women 
than comparable male estimates.  
Gender differences in rent sharing are found to explain no more than two 
percent of the gender wage gap. This is not unexpected as the difference 
between men and women is not in the mean profit levels of employing 
firms but in remuneration from firm profit. As an assessment of bargaining 
differences, one should note that the effect of firm profits on wages is only 
one possible measure of potential increments resulting from bargaining. As 
such, it is likely that the results underestimate true gender differences. A 
better measure of wage bargaining outcomes including for example fringe 
benefits, non-wage benefits and other incentive pay schemes may better 
mirror true gender differences in bargaining strength and its implications 
for the gender wage gap. Nonetheless, this study finds that gender 
                                                            
32 Wage regressions, by gender and industry, also indicate that women in more 
profitable industries vary in terms of whether or not they have greater rent sharing than 
their male counterparts in these industries. Within the construction industry, women are 
found to have significantly greater coefficients for lagged firm profit while within the 
mineral extraction and agricultural industries the reverse is true. Within the largest 
employer, the manufacturing industry, women have significantly smaller coefficients 
for lagged firm profit.  
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Table A1: Sample Means, 1991 
 
  Female Employees  Male Employees 
 
  Mean  Standard Dev.  Mean  Standard Dev. 
Log monthly wage  9.37  0.21  9.53  0.27 
Profit/Employee (100,000 SEK)  0.34  0.48  0.34  0.47 
Education:        
     Elementary School (< 9)  0.18  --  0.15  -- 
     Compulsory School (= 9)  0.18  --  0.13  -- 
     Upper Secondary (< 3)  0.33  --  0.35  -- 
     Upper Secondary (= 3)  0.15  --  0.16  -- 
     Post Secondary   0.09  --  0.11  -- 
     University Undergraduate  0.07  --  0.09  -- 
     University Graduate  0.002  --  0.004  -- 
Experience 15.14  8.82  17.64  10.27 
Seniority   3.55  1.79  3.83  1.74 
Capital Int. (100,000 SEK)  1.98  4.04  2.59  6.83 
Industry mean profits: 
(no. of obs.) 
      













































Number of observations  44,765  --  127,529  -- 
Number of firms  3,115  --  5,415  -- 




Table A2: Sample Means, 1995 
 
  Female Employees  Male Employees 
 
  Mean  Standard Dev.  Mean  Standard Dev. 
Log monthly wage  9.42  0.23  9.57  0.30 
Profit/Employee (100,000 SEK)  0.28  0.46  0.34  0.51 
Education:        
     Elementary School (< 9)  0.12  --  0.11  -- 
     Compulsory School (= 9)  0.14  --  0.11  -- 
     Upper Secondary (< 3)  0.37  --  0.35  -- 
     Upper Secondary (= 3)  0.15  --  0.16  -- 
     Post Secondary   0.13  --  0.15  -- 
     University Undergraduate  0.09  --  0.11  -- 
     University Graduate  0.002  --  0.007  -- 
Experience 18.2  9.19  20.1  10.59 
Seniority   5.39  3.34  5.79  3.41 
Capital Int. (100,000 SEK)  2.39  7.57  2.78  6.74 
Individual Unemployment   0.23  --  0.20  -- 
Industry mean profits: 
(No. of obs) 
      























































Number of observations  50,926  --  124,123  -- 
Number of firms  2,888  --  4,276  -- 
Note: Profit and capital measures in SEK 1990 prices. 
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(contribution of 
differences in 













Unadjusted log wage differential 1991:  0.1546 
 
All variables: 
















































































Notes:  * indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Estimations include controls for 
human capital and industry affiliation. 
1 Contribution of the difference between the observed male coefficients and the pooled 
coefficients to the unadjusted gap in log wages for all characteristics. 
2 Contribution of the difference between the pooled coefficients and the observed female 







 Definition of variables: 
 
 
Wages: Monthly pre-tax full-time equivalent wages in 1990 prices. 
Wage data comes from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), The 
Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF) and from the Income and Asset 
Register (Inkomst och förmögenhetsregistret) of Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
 
Profit per Employee: Firm profits defined as annual profit after capital 
depreciation per employee in 1990 prices and calculated as lagged four-
year averages. Information based on balance-sheet data from MM Partners. 
In estimation, firms with less than three observations or less than two 
employees were removed as well as those with average profits per 
employee below the first percentile and above the 99 percentile. Data on 
employees are from MM Partners.  
 
Education: Seven level dummy variables based on the two-digit level of 
the Swedish Education Nomenclature (SUN code) from the Swedish 
Education Register. These are elementary school (less than 9 years), 
compulsory school (9 years), upper secondary (less than 3 years), upper 
secondary (3 years), post secondary school (less than 3 years), university 
undergraduate studies (3 years or more, not including graduate studies) and 
university graduate studies. 
 
Experience:  Number of years in the labor market based on the 
Employment Register (Sysselsättningsregistret) of Statistics Sweden 
(SCB). 
 
Seniority: Two level dummy variables for 1991 and three level dummy 
variable for 1995, indicating number of years at the establishment. These 
are low seniority (less than 3 years), medium seniority (3.5 – 5.5 years) and 
high seniority (more than 5.5 years). Data based on tracing individuals back 
to 1986 in the Employment Register. 
 
Individual Unemployment: Dummy variable equal to one if individual 
is registered as unemployed during any year from 1992 to 1995. 
Information comes from the National Labor Market Board’s Event 
Database (AMS Händelsedatabas). 
 
Gender: Information comes from Statistics Sweden (SCB) Population 
Census (Registret över totalbefolkningen). 
21 
 Capital Intensity: Capital to labor ratio based on balance-sheet data 
from MM Partners. Capital defined as value of ‘machine’ assets per 
employee in 1990 prices, averaged over preceding four year period. 
 
Proportion Female: Proportion female employees per establishment. 
Calculated from Swedish Establishment Survey (APU). 
 
Industry: Own classification of 9 industries in 1991 and 11 industries in 
1995, based on the 2-digit SIC (SNI69 and SNI92). 
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